"insofar as liberal principles seem to be needed to deal with actual pluralism, these same principles magnify their own necessity over time."

"In fact, however, liberalism tends to see itself and pluralism precisely as such an absolute standard.  As Rawls puts it, pluralism is not simply a de facto problem to which liberalism is the de facto answer; rather pluralism is the product of individual reason working under free, that is to say liberal, institutions.  Indeed, Rawls suggests, increasing pluralism is therefore a social good, producing a variety of viewpoints and encouraging tolerance.  Hence, tolerance is not simply a matter of getting along, a mere modus vivendi, but a normative goal.  But as a normative goal, it also tends to take on the form of an interior disposition that in fact relativizes the good.  In any case, if liberal institutions result in increasingly diverse notions of the good, there would seem to be no principled limit to this process.

     "Given this particularly corrosive version of liberalism, policing the interactions of freedoms becomes a crucial state role."  Etc.

     David S. Crawford, "Gay marriage, public reason, and the common good," Communio:  international Catholic review 41, no. 2 (Summer 2014):  411-412 (380-437), underscoring (and, in the header, italics) mine.