"A natural philosopher, a mathematician, a physician, may be
an excellent man of science without ever having read a Greek or Roman classic,
or the poetical works of his own country; but only a man poetically endowed, as
Kepler was, could possibly discover the three great astronomical laws named
after him. Homer, Shakespeare, Schiller,
and Goethe, stand on a perfect equality with the greatest natural philosophers,
inasmuch as the mental faculty which constitutes the poet and the artist is the
same as that whence discoveries and progress in science spring. Thus it is that the study of languages and of
poetry are often more useful to the technically-accomplished natural
philosopher than any work in his own department of knowledge."
"Ein Naturforscher, Mathematiker, Arzt kann ein
vortrefflicher Mann der Wissenschaft sein ohne jemals die griechischen oder
römischen Klassiker oder die poetischen Werke seiner Nation gelesen zu haben,
aber nur ein Mann von der ungewöhnlichen poetischen Begabung, wie sie Kepler besaß, konnte die drei nach ihm
bennanten großen astronomischen Geseꜩe
entdecken und Homer, Shakspeare, Schiller und Göthe
stehen den größten Naturforschern, freilich in einer ganz andern Richtung,
darin völlig gleich, daß das
geistige Vermögen, welches den Dichter und Künstler macht, das nämliche ist,
aus welchem die Erfindungen und die Fortschritte in der Wissenschaft
entspringen, und so ist den dem technisch ausgebildeten Naturforscher das
Studium der Sprachen und der Dichtwerke häufig von gleichem oft von noch größerem
Nuꜩen, als das vieler Werke seines Faches."
. . . our method does not start from the simple in order to rise to the
complex; but, taking the whole as our starting-point, we endeavor thus to make ourselves
acquainted with the parts. ‘How’ to do
it is a question of art. . . .
. . . in science all investigation is deductive, or à priori. The experiment is but the aid to the process
of thought, as an arithmetical operation is; and the thought, the idea, must
always precede it—necessarily precede it—in every case where a result of
importance is looked for. An empirical
mode of investigation, in the usual meaning of the word, does not in reality
exist. An experiment not preceded by a
theory—that is, by an idea—stands in the same relation to physical
investigation as a child’s rattle to music [(263)].
. . . unsere Methode nicht von dem Einfachen zu dem Zusammengeseꜩten sich erhebt, sondern daß wir von dem Ganzen ausgehen, um
dessen Theile zu finden. . . .
. . . in der Naturwissenschaft ist alle Forschung deductive oder
apriorisch; das Experiment ist nur Hülfsmittel für den Denkproceß, ähnlich wie
die Rechnung; der Gedanke muß ihm in allen Fällen und mit Nothwendigkeit
vorausgehen, wenn es irgend eine Bedeutung haben soll. Eine empirische
Naturforschung in dem gewöhnlichen Sinn existirt gar nicht. Ein Experiment, dem nicht eine Theorie, d. h.
eine Idee, vorhergeht, verhält sich zur Naturforschung wie das Raffeln mit
einer Kinderklapper zur Musik [(49)].
"Indeed, for your faithful, Lord, life is changed, not ended. . . ."
"'Recall the French Revolution and the struggle between the Vendée and the National Convention. . . . the troops of the Convention committed terrible acts—terrible from the point of view of a particular human being. But the acts committed by the troops of the Convention can only be understood in the light of class analysis. They are justified by history because they were committed by a progressive class [(прогрессивный класс)] that was sweeping its path clean of the survivals of feudalism and popular ignorance. The same thing is happening today. You, too, should have understood this.'"
"It was Descartes who took the decisive step [in 'the entrance of the good into the orbit of subjectivity']: 'The true office of reason is to examine the just value of all the goods whose acquisition seems to depend in some way on our conduct.' A bit later he gives an even more radical formulation: 'We must make use of experience and reason to distinguish good and evil and to know their just value, in order not to take one for the other.' That statement is staggering. It is no longer a matter of distinguishing true goods from illusory ones [objectively], or of classifying goods on a graded scale [objectively]. The formulation marks a transition that makes an epoch: good and evil under the yoke of 'value.' Both, good as well as evil, have a common [subjective] reference and are not as opposed as one would think: they have a [subjective] 'value.' It is the latter's measure that alone allows us to distinguish them. The good is no longer directly worthwhile, as good, but rather as what has value [for the subject in question]. It no longer derives its goodness from itself, but from the value assigned to it."
"A natural philosopher, a mathematician, a physician, may be
an excellent man of science without ever having read a Greek or Roman classic,
or the poetical works of his own country; but only a man poetically endowed, as
Kepler was, could possibly discover the three great astronomical laws named
after him. Homer, Shakespeare, Schiller,
and Goethe, stand on a perfect equality with the greatest natural philosophers,
inasmuch as the mental faculty which constitutes the poet and the artist is the
same as that whence discoveries and progress in science spring. Thus it is that the study of languages and of
poetry are often more useful to the technically-accomplished natural
philosopher than any work in his own department of knowledge."
