"there where they are stored up for us in him, we see reflected as in a mirror both the firstfruits and the whole of the world to come."

Mosaic of the Transfiguration,
Monastery of St. Catherine, Mt. Sinai

"For here, in our hearts, Christ takes up his abode together with the Father, saying as he enters:  Today salvation has come to this house.  With Christ, our hearts receive all the wealth of his eternal blessings, and there where they are stored up for us in him, we see reflected as in a mirror both the firstfruits and the whole of the world to come."

     St. Anastasius (d. c. 700), Abbot of the Monastery of St. Catherine on Mt. Sinai, Homily for the Feast of the Transfiguration, as translated rather loosely in the Liturgy of the hours.  Original Greek:  André Guillou, "Le monastère de la Théotokos au Sinaï:  origines; épiclèse; mosaïque de la Transfiguration; Homélie inédite d'Anastase le Sinaïte sur la Transfiguration (étude critique)," Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire 67 (1955):  244 (215-256):

ἐν ᾗ ποιεῖ μονὴν σὺν τῷ Πατρί, ἐν ᾗ παραγενόμενος λέγει·  σήμερον σωτηρία τῷ οἴκῳ τούτῳ γίνεται, ἐν ᾗ πάντες οἱ θησαυροὶ τῶν αἰωνίων ἀγαθῶν σὺν τῷ Χριστῷ παραγίνονται καὶ ἀποτίθενται, ἐν ᾗ πάντων τῶν μελλόντων αἰώνων αἱ ἀπαρχαὶ καὶ εἰκόνες ὡς ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ διαγράφονται.

. . . in which [heart (each ἐν ᾗ appears to refer back to the ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ of p. 244, ll. 3-4)] are painted as in a mirror the firstfruits and icons of all the ages to come.

     Guillou's well-documented hesitations notwithstanding, G. H. Forsyth of the University of Chicago and K. Weitzmann of Princeton University claimed that when they cleaned the mosaic professionally in the 1960s (?) it became obvious that it had "undergone no major restoration in thirteen hundred years" (Jerzy Miziołek, "Transfiguratio Domini in the apse at Mount Sinai and the symbolism of light," Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 53 (1990):  42n2 (42-60)).  But I have made no further inquiries.

The influence of Ragley-Hall heterodoxy (not to mention Kabbalah) upon Robert Barclay

"the understanding of [the pre-incarnate] Christ as a third essence, between God and man, which was suggested by [Anne] Conway and [Francis Mercury] van Helmont seems to have been echoed in Barclay’s understanding of the divine and human attributes of the Vehiculum Dei. Whilst Barclay does not introduce such an explicit typology, his account immediately makes more sense in light of Conway’s threefold categorization [of reality as 'divided essentially into three categories: the immutable God, mutable creatures, and [the pre-incarnate] Christ as mediator between the two']. As noted above, he drew on aspects both of humanity and divinity to describe the body of Christ, whilst denying that it was fully either, which certainly seems to suggest that his view was closer to Conway than t[o] orthodoxy. Furthermore, whilst Conway did think that Christ was also joined to humanity in the Incarnation, she seemed more concerned to emphasize the main differences between these categories than their exact relationship in Christ. Similar ambiguities in Barclay’s Christology and Trinitarian understanding certainly suggest that Barclay and Conway shared similar intellectual priorities."

     Madeleine Pennington, Quakers, Christ, and the Enlightenment (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2021), 154-155, 152.  If this is Pennington's idea of "the theological innovation needed adequately to meet such challenges while retaining the distinctive Quaker emphasis on the immanence of Christ" (134) lacking in the earliest periods of Quakerism ("the links between Robert Barclay, George Keith, Henry More, Anne Conway, and Francis Mercury van Helmont. . . . are a shining example of how nonconformists could be intellectually engaged and theologically innovative (as opposed to merely reactive)" (155-156)), then too bad.  "in Chapter 1 . . . it was noted that Quakers seemed to have changed their understanding of divine immanence, moving towards a sense of altered outlook on ordinary life, rather than a cosmic judgement on the fate of the universe emanating from the human soul. It was further posited in Chapter 2 that these changes might reflect a quest for theological reputation, and we are now in a position to identify the precise mechanism of such a change. Over time, the Quakers struggled to reconcile their understanding of the Light with an adequate account of the Incarnation, and this encouraged an increasingly positive understanding of the outward form over time. Barclay’s Apology was a seminal moment in this process, as it took seriously the need to affirm Christ’s body at the centre of belief in the Light within, and collapsed the previously strong distinction between inward and outward metaphysical forms. This decreased emphasis on a metaphysical 'inwardness', in favour of a more strongly moral distinction, reflected the increasing positivity shown towards the physical body over time. The pace of this change points to a slow and constant intellectual process, rather than a stark political defeat—and this slow process culminated in Barclay’s description of the Vehiculum Dei" (157-158, underscoring mine).  And yet this still wasn't, from the perspective of Christian orthodoxy, "an adequate account of the Incarnation"!
     Nor did it put the even greater heterodoxies of early Quakerism to rest:  "Barclay was clearly trying to address concerns over the Quakers’ orthodoxy, but he did not resolve the puzzles of Quaker Christology entirely. Partly, this was due to a lack of consensus within the movement. Thus, despite his approval of Barclay’s work, in 1677 Fox emphasized the heavenly nature of Christ (in contrast to the 'earthly man' whom he saves), and once again criticized the extra-biblical terminology of the 'Humane body' and 'humanity' of Christ" (158, underscoring mine).  Cf. 169, underscoring mine:  "The simultaneous use of several Christological models was not unusual within Quakerism. As noted above, Fox (who only died in 1691) endorsed Barclay’s publications enthusiastically, and yet even continued to express doubt over the humanity of Christ itself; the earliest Quakers’ metaphorical understanding of reality had not entirely disappeared."

"bought them back and burned them"

Source

      "The uncompromising sternness with which a few Quakers respected a single point of conscience seems to us now an obsession:  Solomon Eccles renounced music teaching and sold his virginals and viols, but feeling guilty, bought them back and burned them. . . .  But this same sensitiveness later drove John Woolman to refuse all compromise about slavery."

     Hugh Barbour, The Quakers in Puritan England, Yale publications in religion 7 (New Haven and London:  Yale University Press, 1964), 161-162.

"We had become unworthy to pray, but God in his goodness has permitted us to speak with him."

"Man has [but] one noble office:  that of praying and loving.  [So] pray, love:  that is the happiness of man on earth!"
     . . .
     "We had become unworthy to pray, but God in his goodness has permitted us to speak with him.  Our prayer is an incense that he receives with an extreme pleasure."

     "L'homme a une belle fonction:  celle de prier et de aimer. . .  Vous priez, vous aimez:  voilà le bonheur de l'homme sur la terre!"
     . . .
     "Nous avions mérité de ne pas prier; mais Dieu, dans sa bonté, nous a permis de lui parler.  Notre prière est un encens qu’il reçoit avec un extreme plaisir."

     St. John Vianney, the Curé d'Ars, "Catéchisme sur la priére," in Esprit du Curé d'Ars:  M. Vianney dans ses catéchismes ses homélies et sa conversation, ed. A. Monnin (Paris:  Douniol, 1864), 110, translation mine.

"Happiness is neither without us nor within us. It is in God, both without us and within us."

 "Le bonheur n’est ni hors de nous ni dans nous. Il est en Dieu et hors et dans nous."

     Blaise Pascal, Pensée 465 Brunschvicg =Faugère II, 93, VIII / Havet I.9 bis / Tourneur p. 304-5 / Le Guern 386 / Lafuma 407 / Sellier 26.

"We know that we do not dream, and, however impossible it is for us to prove it by reason, this inability demonstrates only the weakness of our reason, but not, as they affirm, the uncertainty of all our knowledge."

      Blaise Pascal, Pensée 282 Brunschvicg =Faugère II, 108, XXIX / Havet VIII.6 / Michaut 420 / Tourneur p.195-1 / Le Guern 101 / Lafuma 110 / Sellier 142, trans. Trotter:

Nous savons que nous ne rêvons point, quelque impuissance où nous soyons de le prouver par raison ; cette impuissance ne conclut autre chose que la faiblesse de notre raison, mais non pas l’incertitude de toutes nos connaissances, comme ils le prétendent.

And

it is as useless and absurd for reason to demand from the heart proofs of her first principles, before admitting them, as it would be for the heart to demand from reason an intution of all demonstrated propositions before accepting them. 

il est aussi inutile et aussi ridicule que la raison demande au cœur des preuves de ses premiers principes pour vouloir y consentir, qu’il serait ridicule que le cœur demandât à la raison un sentiment de toutes les propositions qu’elle démontre pour vouloir les recevoir.

Also Pensée 267 Brunschvicg =Faugère II, 347, I / Havet XIII.1 / Tourneur p. 232-1 / Le Guern 177 / Lafuma 188 / Sellier 220:

The last proceeding of reason is to recognize that there is an infinity of things which are beyond it.  It is but feeble if it does not see so far as to know this.  But if natural things are beyond it, what will be said of supernatural? 

La dernière démarche de la raison est de reconnaître qu’il y a une infinité de choses qui la surpassent. Elle n’est que faible si elle ne va jusqu’à connaître cela.
Que si les choses naturelles la surpassent, que dira-t‑on des surnaturelles?

Also Pensée 395 Brunschvicg =Faugère II, 99, XXII / Havet VIII.9 / Tourneur p. 304-4 / Le Guern 385 / Lafuma 406 / Sellier 25:

We have an incapacity of proof, insurmountable by all dogmatism.  We have an idea of truth, invincible to all scepticism. 

Nous avons une impuissance de prouver invincible à tout le dogmatisme.  Nous avons une idée de la vérité invincible à tout le pyrrhonisme.

"Men often take their imagination for their heart; and they believe they are converted as soon as they think of being converted."

     Blaise Pascal, Pensée 275 Brunschvicg =Faugère I, 229, CLXX / Havet XXIV.51 / Le Guern 756 / Lafuma 975 / Sellier 739, trans. Trotter:

Les hommes prennent souvent leur imagination pour leur cœur et ils croient être convertis dès qu’ils pensent à se convertir.

Cf. also Bossuet. 

Love is love

2 Cor 12:20-13:11 RSV:  "I fear that when I come again . . . I may have to mourn over many of those who sinned before and have not repented of the impurity, immorality, and licentiousness which they have practiced. . . . I warned those who sinned before and all the others, and I warn them now while absent, as I did when present on my second visit, that if I come again I will not spare them—since you desire proof that Christ is speaking in me. He is not weak in dealing with you, but is powerful in you. For he was crucified in weakness, but lives by the power of God. For we are weak in him, but in dealing with you we shall live with him by the power of God. . . . Mend your ways."

The early Quaker "campaign to bring the world under the conquest of the Light was built upon fierce judgment and condemnation."

      Hugh Barbour, The Quakers in Puritan England, Yale publications in religion 7 (New Haven and London:  Yale University Press, 1964), 127.  "A clear difference in tone separates the fiery warnings of preachers, who 'threshed the world' at great public meetings, from the gentle ministry within Quaker Meetings."  For "To Friends the greater responsibility was the taking of the word of the Lord to the men in the world" (131-132).  Thus George Fox (137, underscoring mine):

O Lawson, oh Blood sucker, oh Esau, who would slay the Righteous and slayeth them in thy hart . . . thou cunning ffox who seeks to devoure the lambs of Jesus Christ . . . oh thou serpent who are painted outwardly with the saints words, but a murtherer and killer of the Just, oh thou viper. . . .  Neither count this hard language nor rivile at it, its the love of the lord god to thee.

"love and reason are but one and the same thing"

     "Love gives [way] to [(donne de)] the mind and is sustained by the mind.  Address is necessary in order to love. . . .

     "Some have on purpose [(à propos)] wrongly deprived the term reason of love and opposed them unjustifiably, for love and reason are but one [and the] same thing:  [love] is a rush [(precipitation)] of thoughts entertained one-sidedly [(qui se porte d’un costé)] without a proper examination of [(sans bien examiner) the] whole, but it is always a reason. . . .  Let us therefore not exclude reason from love, because it is inseparable from it."

     "L’amour donne de l’esprit, et il se soustient par l’esprit.  Il faut de l’addresse pour aymer. . . .
     "L’on a osté mal à propos le nom de raison à l’amour, et on les a opposez sans un bon fondement, car l’amour et la raison n’est qu’une mesme chose.  C’est une precipitation de pensées qui se porte d’un costé sans bien examiner tout, mais c’est tousjours une raison. . . . N’excluons donc point la raison de l’amour, puisqu’elle en est inseparable."

     Discours sur les passions de l’amour, Œuvres de Blaise Pascal, ed. Brunschvieg, Boutroux, and Gasier, tom. 3, ed. Brunschvieg and Boutroux (1908), 127, 136.  Reading alternative to "l'amour et la raison n’est qu'une mesme chose":  "l'amour et la raison n'est que la mesme chose".  Trans. Wright:

     Love gives intellect and is sustained by intellect.  Address is needed in order to love. . . .
     We have unaptly taken away the name of reason from love and have opposed them to each other without good foundation, for love and reason are but the same thing.  It is a precipitation of thought which is impelled to a side before examining every thing, but it is still a reason, and we should not and cannot wish that it were otherwise, for we would then be very disagreeable machines.  Let us not therefore exclude reason from love, since they are inseparable.  The poets were not right in painting Love blind; we must take off his bandage and restore him henceforth the enjoyment of his eyes.

But Pascal's authorship has been definitively disproven.  See, for example, p. 1209 of vol. 2 of the most recent Pléiade edition of the Œuvres complètes (Paris:  Gallimard, 2000), which reprints it in an appendix, but for historical reasons (of the past century or so) alone, and suggests, as potential imitators who would have had the requisite exposure to La Rouchefoucauld and Malebranche as well, Charles-Paul d'Escoubleau (Lafuma) and, somewhat more persuasively, Henri-Louis de Loménie de Brienne (Mesnard).