"without faith it is impossible to please him. For whoever would draw near to God must believe that he exists and that he rewards those who seek him."

The 1) existence and 2) providence of God are the first two things in which faith, to be saving, must believe.

"l’existence de Dieu et celle de sa providence constituent les deux premiers credibilia auxquels se ramène la nécessite de la foi salutaire."

     Jean-Pierre Torrell, “«Dieu conduit toutes choses vers leur fin»:  providence et gouvernement divin chez Thomas d’Aquin,” Nouvelles recherches thomasiennes, Bibliotheque thomiste 61, ed. L.-J. Bataillon, O.P, and A. Oliva, O.P. (Paris:  Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 2008), 75n2, citing Serge Thomas Bonino, O.P., “Introduction” to Thomas d’Aquin, De la vérité Question 2:  (La science en Dieu) (Fribourg, Suisse:  Editions Universitaires; Paris:  Editions du Cerf, 1996), 132-135 (43-134), who says that for St. Thomas, "all the articles of faith are implicitly contained in two major credibilia that every believer, no matter the theological age to which he belongs, is held to believe explicitly.  These two fundamental truths, which constitute therefore the heart of the Christian message, are those enunciated by the author of the epistle to the Hebrews, in a verse cited repeatedly by Saint Thomas", i.e. Heb 11:6.  "The entire Christian faith is thus as it were recapitulated in the belief in God and in a provident God.  These two credibilia are moreover inseparable, for, in the biblical perspective, a improvident God would not be truly God; and Saint Thomas himself stresses that the idea of God is intrinsically tied to that of a providence.  Thus, for Saint Thomas, all later developments of the object of faith are contained in germ in the faith in providence.  In particular, faith in providence includes 'everything that God dispenses in time for the salvation of men and which are the ways towards beatitude", for example, "faith in the redemptive Incarnation of the Word and in the entire supernatural order that flows therefrom.  The act of faith in divine providence embraces therefore all of the particular modalities that, in the course of time, 'the benevolent plan of God' (Eph 1:9, τὴν εὐδοκίαν αὐτοῦ), the history of salvation, assumes" (Bonino, 132-133, with many references).
     The passage above in a somewhat more literal translation:  "the existence of God and that of his providence constitute the two first credibilia to which the necessity of the faith [that is] salutary is led back."

"Spirituality" is not very often "life according to the Spirit" for St. Thomas

"one can consider as assured the following conclusions:

     "1. One meets again quite unmistakably in Thomas two of the three senses [of spiritualitas] isolated by the earlier investigations [mentioned in footnotes 1 ff.]:  the philosophical sense, frequently attested, according to which spiritualitas is opposed to corporeitas or to materialitas; [and] the juridical sense, comparatively rare, according to which the term is found employed in [the] context of simony or of spiritual kinship.

     "2. The properly religious sense of «life according to the Spirit» is present in him, but in no way dominant [(mais de façon non majoritaire)].  Most often it retains its tie to the first philosophical sense and only an attentive reading permits [one] to determine whether it is a question of a spiritualitas gratiae or [only] a spiritualitas by [virtue of a] simple separation from materialitas.
     "3. This ambivalent use [of the term] is especially evident in the domain of continence (virginity and marriage), and it is [in that domain] that one finds it used the most.  [Yet] even there it stands most often not for the state of «spirituality» made possible by the terrestrial practice of continence, but rather for the spirituality in glory that is the recompense for it."

     Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., "«spiritualitas» chez Saint Thomas d'Aquin:  contribution à l'histoire d'un mot," in Recherches thomasiennes:  études revues et augmentées, Bibliothèque thomiste 52, ed. L.-J. Bataillon, O.P. (Paris:  Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 2000), 323-324 (315-234) =Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 73 (1989):  583 (575-584).  Conclusions 4 and 5 have to do with 4) the extent to which spiritualitas is in the early Thomas a loan word merely, and 5) the decline in his usage of it after 1260.  An Addendum to the article as published in the Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques considers his use of the adjective spiritualis, which is much less ambiguously indicative of "the life in charity and the exercise of the virtues" (524).

Marx on communism

"The Rheinische Zeitung, which cannot concede the theoretical reality of communist ideas even in their present form, and can even less wish or consider possible their practical realization, will submit these ideas to a thorough criticism. If the Augsburg paper demanded and wanted more than slick phrases, it would see that writings such as those of Leroux, Considerant, and above all Proudhon's penetrating work, can be criticized, not through superficial notions of the moment, but only after long and deep study. We consider such 'theoretical' works the more seriously as we do not agree with the Augsburg paper, which finds the 'reality' of communist ideas not in Plato but in some obscure acquaintance who, not without some merit in some branches of scientific research, gave up the entire fortune that was at his disposal at the time and polished his confederates' dishes and boots, according to the will of Father Enfantin. We are firmly convinced that it is not the practical Attempt, but rather the theoretical application of communist ideas, that constitutes the real danger; for practical attempts, even those on a large scale, can be answered with cannon as soon as they become dangerous, but ideas, which conquer our intelligence, which overcome the outlook that reason has riveted to our conscience, are chains from which we cannot tear ourselves away without tearing our hearts; they are demons that man can overcome only by submitting to them."

     Karl Marx, "[Communism and the Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung]," Rheinische Zeitung, 16 October 1842, just five years before the composition of the Communist manifesto.  Trans.  Original here.  "The Rhineland News, Marx argued, would not concede communism any 'theoretical reality,' much less any effort at 'practical realization.'  He found the theory much more ominous than the practice.  The 'intellectual implementation' of communist ideas would be the 'genuine danger,' for such ideas could 'defeat our intelligence, conquer our sentiments. . . ."  To meet that danger, he proposed a careful study of the works of prominent communists, for the purpose of engaging in a 'fundamental criticism of their ideas.'  By contrast, 'practical attempts [to introduce communism], even attempts en masse, can be answered with cannons'" (Jonathan Sperber, Karl Marx:  a nineteenth-century life (New York:  Liveright Publishing Company, 2013 ), 99, on a tip from John Gray, "The real Karl Marx," The New York review of books 60, no. 8 (May 9, 2013):  38 (38-40)).
     What is more, "In a speech to the Cologne Democratic Society in August 1848, Marx rejected revolutionary dictatorship by a single class as 'nonsense'—an opinion so strikingly at odds with the views Marx had expressed only six months earlier in the Communist Manifesto that later Marxist-Leninist editors of his speeches mistakenly refused to accept its authenticity—and over twenty years later, at the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War, Marx also dismissed any notion of a Paris Commune as 'nonsense'" (Gray, 38).

"Public opinion does not change this fast in free societies. Either opinion is not changing as fast as it appears to be, or society is not as free."

"Public opinion does not change this fast in free societies. Either opinion is not changing as fast as it appears to be, or society is not as free."

     Christopher Caldwell, 2013.

"the most absolute monarchs in Europe cannot prevent certain opinions [(pensées)] hostile to their authority from circulating in secret throughout their dominions and even in their courts.  It is not so in America; as long as the majority is still undecided, discussion is carried on [(on parle)]; but as soon as its decision is irrevocably pronounced, everyone is silent [(chacun se tait)], and the friends as well as the opponents of the measure unite in assenting to its propriety. . . .
     "The authority of a king is physical [(matérielle)] and controls the actions of men without subduing their will.  But the majority possesses a power that is physical and moral [(matérielle et morale)] at the same time, which acts upon the will as much as upon the actions and represses not only all contest but all controversy [(le fait et le désir de faire)].
     "I know of no country in which there is so little independence of mind and real freedom of discussion [(indépendance d'esprit et de véritable libérté de discussion)] as in America."

     Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America I.xv =vol. II, chap. vii, sec. 5, p. 142 in the 12th ed. of 1848 ("Unlimited power of the majority in America, and its consequences"), trans. Reeve, Bowen, & Bradley.  Cf. "I seek to trace the novel features under which despotism may appear in the world [(Je veux imaginer sous quels traits nouveaux le despotisme pourrait se produire dans le monde)]" (II.iv.6; Pleiade, p. 836).

"freedom of opinion does not exist in America."

     Ibid., p. 265.

     Cf. this passage.

"With the American, freedom is anything but a mere absence of restraint, an arbitrary, licentious indulgence, every one following his natural impulse".

"The aspirations of this new kind of citizen were moderated by what Thomas Jefferson had called 'temperate liberty':  a capacity for self-government in which the rational understanding acts as a check on the unruly will. And the inner psychological structure of this temperate republican matched the outer system of checks and balances built into the republic itself.  For Jefferson temperate liberty was the key to both personal happiness and civil society.  It was a 'conception of freedom,' as Philip Schaff realized,

specifically different from the purely negative notion which prevails amongst the radicals and revolutionists of Europe.  With the American, freedom is anything but a mere absence of restraint[, an arbitrary, licentious indulgence, every one following his natural impulse, as the revolutionists would have it.  I]t is a rational, moral, self-determination, hand in hand with law, order, and authority.  True national freedom, in the American view, rests upon a moral groundwork, upon the virtue of self-possession and self-control in individual citizens.[  He alone is worthy of this great blessing and capable of enjoying it who holds his passions in check; is master of his sensual nature; obeys natural laws, not under pressure from without, but from inward impulse, cheerfully and joyfully.  But the negative and hollow liberalism, or rather the radicalism, which undermines the authority of law, and sets itself against Christianity and the church, necessarily dissolves all social ties, and ends in anarchy; which then passes very easily into the worst and most dangerous form of despotism.]"

     Andrew Delbanco, The real American dream: a meditation on hope, The William E. Massey Sr. lectures in the history of American civilization 1998 (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1999), 61-62.  Delbanco is citing Philip Schaff, America:  a sketch of the political, social, and religious character of the United States of North America, in two lectures, (New York:  C. Scribner, 1855), 43-44 (though I have reinserted in brackets what Delbanco leaves out:  what he almost has to leave out, since he has moved from the chapter on "God" to the chapter on "Nation" (en route to the chapter on "Self")).

"a democracy can obtain truth only as the result of experience; and many nations may perish while they are awaiting the consequences of their errors."

"la démocratie ne peut obtenir la vérité que de l'expérience, et beaucoup de peuples ne sauraient attendre, sans périr, les résultats de leurs erreurs."

     Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America I (1835).I.XIII.14 ("Self-control of the American democracy"), trans. Henry Reeve, with revisions by Francis Bowen and Phillips Bradley ((New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997), vol. 1, p. 231);  Œuvres, ed. André Jardin (Bibliothèque de la Pléiade), II (De la démocratie en Amérique), ed. Jean-Claude Lamberti and James T. Schleifer (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1992), 257.  

"Communion and contemplation belong therefore together."

"Love desires no recompense other than to be loved in return; and thus God desires nothing in return for his love for us other than our love. . . . To understand this deed of love primarily, not to say exclusively, as something passed on apostolically from man to man, would be to instrumentalize the revelation of absolute love, wholly reducing it to a means or impulse directed to a human end, rather than seeing it as personal and absolute itself.  To center Christianity in anthropology and thus turn it into pure ethics would be to eliminate its theo-logical dimension.  Israel . . . must remain a warning in this respect:  the jealous God, who makes a gift of himself in the covenant, desires in the first place nothing other than his partner's zealously faithful love—for him.  Indeed, we must love absolute love and direct our love to the Lover, setting aside all other relative and competing objects of love.  To the extent that we do not remain absolutely faithful to absolute love, these objects turn into idols.  The bridegroom and the bride in the Song of Songs have no children; they are everything and sufficient for one another, and all their fruitfulness lies enclosed within the circle of their mutual love:  hortus conclusus, fons signatus.
     "In the same way, every Christian 'apostolate' strays from love and becomes a rationalized siphoning of love (cf. Judas' pseudo-charitable objection to Mary's utterly 'wasteful' squandering in Jn 12:3-8) to the extent that absolute love does not receive a response that is likewise absolute and not directed to any ulterior end.  We call this response 'worship'. . . . Since it serves no ulterior purpose, this attitude of readiness cannot but appear useless in the eyes of the world, which is caught up in so many urgent and reasonable occupations (Lk 10:42). . . . God's love, from which all fruitfulness stems, will be powerful enough to produce all of the fruit pleasing to him in mankind and the world out of this single-hearted nuptial surrender. . . .
     "Prayer, both ecclesial and personal prayer, thus ranks higher than all action, not in the first place as a source of psychological energy ('refueling', as they say today), but as the act of worship and glorification that befits love, the act in which one makes the most fundamental attempt to answer with selflessness and thereby shows that one has understood the divine proclamation.  It is as tragic as it is ridiculous to see Christians today giving up this fundamental priority—which is witnessed to by the entire Old and New Testament, by Jesus' life as much as by Paul's and John's theology—and seeking instead an immediate encounter with Christ in their neighbor, or even in purely worldly work and technological activity.  Engaged in such work, they soon loose the capacity to see any distinction between worldly responsibility and Christian mission.  Whoever does not come to know the face of God in contemplation will not recognize it in action, even when it reveals itself to him in the face of the oppressed and humiliated.
     "Moreover, the celebration of the Eucharist is itself an anamnesis, which means that it is contemplation in love and the communion of love with love; and it is only from such a celebration that a Christian mission goes out into the world:  'Ite missa-missio est!'"

     Hans Urs von Balthasar, Love alone is credible, trans. D. C. Schindler, chap. 8 ("Love as deed") ((San Francisco:  Ignatius Press, 2004), 109).

He who "Gottes Antlitz nicht aus der Kontemplation kennt, wird es in der Aktion nicht wiedererkennen, selbst dann nicht, wenn es ihm aus dem Antlitz der Erniedrigten und Beleidigten entgegenleuchtet.
     "Auch die Feier der Eucharistie is Anamnesis und darin Kontemplation der Liebe mit Liebe; und nur von ihr her ergeht ein christliches Ite Missa-Missio est! in die Welt."

     Hans Urs von Balthasar, Glaubhaft ist nur Liebe, 6th ed. (Einsiedeln, 2000), 73, as quoted by Jan-Heiner Tück in "Verborgene Gegenwart und betrachtendes Verweilen:  zur poetischen Theologie des Hymnus «Adoro te devote»," Communio:  Internationale katholische Zeitschrift 34, no. 4 (2005):  403 and 414n12 (401-418).