"a sober person does not take less pleasure in food taken in moderation than the glutton, but his concupiscence reposes less in such pleasures."

"Beasts are without reason. In this way man becomes, as it were, like them in coition, because he cannot moderate concupiscence. In the state of innocence nothing of this kind would have happened that was not regulated by reason, not because delight of sense was less, as some say (rather indeed would sensible delight have been the greater in proportion to [(fuisset enim tanto maior delectatio sensibilis, quanto)] the greater purity of nature and the greater sensibility of the body), but because the force of concupiscence would not have so inordinately thrown itself into [(non ita inordinate se effudisset super)] such pleasure, being curbed by reason, whose place it is not to lessen sensual pleasure, but to prevent the force of concupiscence from cleaving to it immoderately [(ad quam non pertinet ut sit minor delectatio in sensu, sed ut vis concupiscibilis non immoderate delectationi inhaereat)]. By 'immoderately' I mean going beyond the bounds of reason, as a sober person does not take less pleasure in food taken in moderation than the glutton, but his concupiscence lingers less in such pleasures [(sobrius in cibo moderate assumpto non minorem habet delectationem quam gulosus; sed minus eius concupiscibilis super huiusmodi delectatione requiescit)]. This is what Augustine means by the words quoted, which do not exclude intensity of pleasure [(magnitudinem delectationis)] from the state of innocence, but ardor of desire and restlessness of the mind [(ardorem libidinis et inquietudinem animi)]."

     St. Thomas Aquinas, ST I.98.2.ad 3, trans. FEDP.  As trans. more freely by Edmund Hill on pp. 157 and 159 of vol. 13 of the Blackfriars edition published in 1964:

Animals lack reason.  So what makes man like the animals in copulation is the inability of reason to temper the pleasure of copulation and the heat of desire.  But in the state of innocence there would have been nothing of this sort that was not tempered by reason.  Not that the pleasurable sensation would have been any the less intense, as some [(Bonaventure, Alexander of Hales)] say, for the pleasure of sense would have been all the greater, given the purity of man's nature and sensibility of his body.  But the pleasure urge would not have squandered itself in so disorderly a fashion on this sort of pleasure when it was ruled by reason.  It is not demanded by this empire of reason that the pleasurable sensation should be any the less, but that the pleasure urge should not clutch at the pleasure in an immoderate fashion; and by 'immoderate' I mean going beyond the measure of reason.  Thus a sober man has no less pleasure in food taken moderately than a greedy man; but his pleasure urge does not wallow so much in this sort of pleasure.  And this is the bearing of Augustine's words, which do not exclude intensity of pleasure from the state of innocence, but impetuous lust and disturbance of mind.