Source |
Paul Ricœur, "L’attention: étude phénoménologie de l’attention et de ses connexions philosophiques" (Cercle philosophique de l’Ouest, Rennes, 2 March 1939), Studia phænomenologica 13 (2013): 40 (21-50). Immediate context:
an act of the mind can be adynamic: neither active nor passive. Or, rather, because to know is not to suffer, knowing can be experienced in the passive mode (fascination) or in the active mode (voluntary attention). There is no contradiction about an act’s being at once receptive and active; or indeed [(bien)] receptive and passive. Fascination is at once receptivity inasmuch as it knows, and passivity inasmuch as [it is a] duration endured [(durée subie)]; voluntary attention is at once receptivity by its adherence to the object and activity by its inherence in the subject and by its liberty of focus [(orientation)].
. . . knowledge can be experienced in the active mode without being productive of its object. . . . By attention, I place myself actively at the disposal of [(me mets activement au compte de)] the object.
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