The modern political liberalism of late antique Rome

"'The laws should punish offences against another's property, not offences against a man's own personal character.  No one should be brought to trial except for an offence, or threat of offence, against another's property, house, or person; but anyone should be free to do as he likes about his own, or with his own, or with others, if they consent.'"

"Quid alienae uineae potius quam quid suae uitae quisque noceat, legibus aduertatur.  Nullus ducatur ad iudicem, nisi qui alienae rei domui saluti uel cuiquam inuito fuerit inportunus aut noxius; ceterum de suis uel cum suis uel cum quibusque uolentibus faciat quisque quod libet."

     Augustine, De civitate Dei ii.20, as trans. Henry Bettenson.  Augustine is channeling Roman pagans "unconcerned about the utter corruption of their country".  I was put onto this by John Milbank, Theology and social theory:  beyond secular reason, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA:  Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 405:  "It is clear, then, that Augustine does not endorse, indeed utterly condemns, every tendency towards a view of personhood as 'self-ownership', and of ownership itself as unrestricted freedom within one's own domain."  Latin from CSEL 40.1, ed. Dombart & Kalb (1899), p. 87 l. 24-p. 88 l. 2.
     And yet, as De civitate Dei ii.20 intimates, this concern for the property, houses, and persons of others was extended only to the superior (and respectably licentious) rich, not prostitutes, their inferiors, or any concerned for and/or expressive on the subject of the true spiritual good of the former.

Wesley and Asbury

Wesley "had great sympathy and even admiration for the working people of England, but it was the sympathy of an outsider.  When he traveled, Wesley routinely lodged with wealthy supporters, who were nevertheless not Methodists, rather than stay in the homes of more humble members.  Asbury never adopted a similar practice.  His early life was more commonplace than Wesley's and he never expected to be treated like a gentleman."

     John Wigger, "John Wesley and Francis Asbury," Methodist history 54, no. 4 (July 2016):  274 (271-284).  On p. 277 is a beautiful paragraph on Asbury as a houseguest and how that "'exposed him, continually, to public and private observation and inspection'" (Ezekiel Cooper) and endeared him to his people.

"How foolish, a Burgundian knight exclaimed bitterly, were all those lesser men who had risked death to fight a war so easily forgotten by the great."

     "In January 1435, all wrapped in furs against the perishing cold, an illustrious gathering assembled two hundred miles south of Arras at Nevers, between Armagnac Bourges and Burgundian Dijon. The duke of Burgundy had come to meet the Armagnac count of Clermont – newly elevated to the dukedom of Bourbon after the death of his father, who had never regained his freedom after Agincourt. The two men had spent much of 1434 in a battle for control of the border lands between their territories in eastern France; now, however, they had agreed a truce. The fact that the new duke of Bourbon was Burgundy’s brother-in-law, thanks to his marriage years earlier to the duke’s sister Agnes, had done nothing to stop the fighting, but now that diplomatic relations had been restored, Bourbon brought with him to the conference at Nevers another brother-in-law, Constable Richemont, the husband of Burgundy’s sister Margaret. Along with these two Armagnac princes of the blood, King Charles had sent his chancellor, the subtle and experienced archbishop of Reims. It was a happy reunion: so joyous, one chronicler said, that it appeared as though these lords had always been at peace. (How foolish, a Burgundian knight exclaimed bitterly, were all those lesser men who had risked death to fight a war so easily forgotten by the great.)"

     Helen Castor, Joan of Arc:  a history (New York:  Harper, 2015 [2014]), chap. 11 ("Those who called themselves Frenchmen").  Castor's source would appear to be Enguerrand de Monstrelet (d. 1453), La Chronique d’Enguerran de Monstrelet, ed. L. Douët-d’Arcq, 6 vols (Paris, 1857–62), vol. 5, p. 108 (or 1434 overall):

Et lors, ung chevalier de Bourgongne, là estant, dist hault et cler:  ‘Entre nous aultres, sommes bien mal conseillés de nous adventurer et mettre en péril de corps et de ame pour les singulières voulentés des princes et grans seigneurs, lesquelz, quand il leur plaist, se réconcilient l’un avec l’autre, et souvent en advient que nous en demourons povres et détruis.’  Si fut ceste parole bien notée et entendue des pluiseurs, là estans, de toutes les deux parties.  Et bien y avoit raison.  Car très souvent en advient ainsy. 

And then a knight of Burgundy, standing there, said loud and clear:  'Among us all [(aultres, others)] are many [who were] badly counseled to hazard and place ourselves in bodily and spiritual peril for the self-interested [(singulières, personal)] desires [(voulentés)] of princes and great lords, who, when[ever] it serves their purposes [(leur plaist, pleases them)], are [this easily] reconciled the one with the other, though [(et)] it often happens, as a consequence [(en)], that we by them [(en)] are left impoverished and in ruins.'  So this comment was well noted and heard by many standing about, of both parties.  And with good reason.  For it happens thus all too often.

"wherever it is certain that something essential for salvation is impossible, it is also certain that there really exists a supernatural possibility."

"Là où il est certain qu’une chose indispensable au salut est impossible, il est certain qu’il existe réellement une possibilité surnaturelle."

     Simone Weil, "Theory of the sacraments," in Gateway to God, ed. David Raper with the collaboration of Malcolm Muggeridge and Vernon Sproxton (London:  Collins, Fontana Books, 1974), 65.  I was put onto this by Claire Wolfteich, "Attention or destruction:  Simone Weil and the paradox of the Eucharist," Journal of religion 81, no. 3 (July 2001):  368 (359-376).  For the original French, see Simone Weil, "Théorie des sacrements," Pensées sons ordre concernant l’amour de Dieu, Collection espoir (Gallimard, 1962), 136.
     And the "supernatural possibility" here is, of course, the purification of the soul that a simultaneously passively and actively faith-ful reception of the Eucharist—which is "the absolute spiritual good in terms of the flesh [(le bien absolu par rapport à la chair)]" (66/136; for "Human nature is so arranged that a desire of the soul has no reality within the soul until it has passed through the body by means of actions, movements, and attitudes" (65/135))—is, thanks to "an agreement [(convention)] established by God" (66/137), capable of effecting.

Pseudo-Melanchthon?

"In the afternoon began the preliminary skirmish over the rules of the tournament.  The first question was whether to have stenographers.  Eck said no, because taking them into account would chill the passionate heat of the debate.  'The truth might fare better at a lower temperature,' commented Melanchthon."

     Roland Bainton, Here I stand:  a life of Martin Luther (New York and Nashville:  Abingdon Press, 1950), 112, ll. 17-18 (chap. 6, "The Saxon Hus," under "The Leipzig debate").
     Bainton's endnotes make it clear that he is working with the Walch edition of Luther's Schriften, though he does not give his source for these words in particular, but only l. 13 on the one hand, and l. 24 on the other.  Clyde Leonard Manschreck, writing in 1958 (Melanchthon:  the quiet reformer, pp. 46 and 323), uses Bainton's very words, does not place them within quotation marks, and cites CR 1, 91 (I am indebted to Dan Graves for reminding me to follow up on that use of the aphorism).  And Gregory B. Graybill, writing in 2015 (The Honeycomb Scroll: Philipp Melanchthon at the Dawn of the Reformation, p. 181), uses Bainton's very words, does not place them within quotation marks, and cites MBW 59 =CR 1, 91, both of which would 1) match Walch, vol. 15, no. 394 (col. 1219 in this printing of [1880]-1910), i.e. the letter of Melanchthon to Oecolampadius dated 21 July 1519 and 2) fall right into the middle of the other Walch passages cited by Bainton on both sides of ll. 17-18.  Yet Melanchthon isn't (at that very point, at least) nearly so aphoristic.  Indeed, the word "truth" does not occur, whether in the original Latin or in Walch's German translation:

First Eck pleaded [(caussatus est)] with those who had been designated prefects of the disputation by the most illustrious prince George, the duke of Saxony, patron of humane learning, contrary to what had been agreed ([namely] that [the disputation] seem/be seen to be [governed] by the law of disputants), [that] it not be written down [(ne dictaretur)], that the inflammatory force/violence of those who, about to fight [(pugnaturi, FAP-NMP)], dispute in words [might not] gradually cease to boil [(defervere)] by reason of the pause[s] for writing [(per stili moram)]; [since] in the attack spirits [might] rise, [but] in the delaying [(contando < cunctando < cunctor?  Walch:  Zaudern) might] give way.  For that reason I do not know whether [that] could be seen from [the perspective of] 'theological simplicity', given that [(ubi, when)] nothing must stand out to such a degree that everything seems [to be] said as an attack or impetuously or in an intemperate spirit [(nihil tam praestandum est, quam ut ne quid impetu, ne quid temere, ne quid immodico animo dictum videatur)].  And that in studies of literature [(studiis literarum)] and above all in the business of piety [(negocio pietatis)] I think nothing either more important or more wholesome in the close combat/encounter [(congressu familiari)] of the learned and good [than] when [(ubi)] opinion/proposition [(sententia)] is compared with opinion/proposition by gentle and tranquil and minimally pertinacious spirits, [and] when [(ubi)] it is neither disgraceful to be conquered nor praiseworthy to conquer; so that I consider scarcely anything more pernicious than these popular debates in which [(ubi)] the concern for victory cannot but raise a clamor against [those on the opposite side], however well-intentioned [they be (ubi non potest quantumvis bonis non obstrepere victoriae cura)].

MBW 59 =CR 1, 91, trans. Steve Perisho, with input from Dr. Owen Ewald.
     Unless someone can point me to some other report on the preliminaries of the Leipzig Disputation (but I have searched those gathered in vol. 15 of the Walch edition used by Bainton, Neue revidirte Stereotypausgabe (St. Louis, MO:  Concordia Publishing House, 1899), cols. (802) 844-1259 (1377), for occurrences of "Wahrheit" without turning up a match that stood out to me), the phraseology should therefore be attributed to Bainton, not Melanchthon, despite the fact that Bainton employed quotation marks.  Indeed, Graybill wrote on 9 August 2016 to confirm that he "chose not to use quotation marks around that specific phrase because [he] did not find a direct quotation to that effect", and that though "[Bainton's] use of quotation marks is curious," "it's more likely [his] summary rather than Melanchthon's quotation."
     The editor of MBW 59 (in MBW T1) references, at this point (following Melanchthon himself), in addition to Gregory of Nazianzus' De moderatione in disputationibus servanda (MPG 36, cols. 174-212), and the translations of that by Melanchthon and Oecolampadius, two of the adages discussed at length by Erasmus, namely I.iii.7 ("Quot homines, tot sententiae", "So many men, so many opinions", CWE 31, pp. 240-241) and IV.i.1 ("Dulce bellum inexpertis", "War is a treat for those who have not tried it", CWE 35, pp. 399-440).  But neither of them seem to lie directly behind the Bainton rendition.
     This would not be the only point at which Bainton interjected his own personality into Here I stand.

I have been baptized (Ego sum baptizatus)!

1531 June 4, Predigt am Trinitatissonntag, WA 34.1, p. 504a, ll. 9-11 (cf. also b, ll. 19ff.:  "ego et omnes Christiani sunt baptizati In hoc uno deo et in his nominibus"):  "Habes ergo hic ij gute stuck contra Satanam:  non dispute tecum, ut me treibts, ut Euangelium, ut verbum dei uberlege, sed sum baptizatus in nomine patris u. da bey bleib, tam diu duravit."  This one does not seem to be included in the first installment of LW.

1535-1545, Lectures on Genesis 48:21, WA 44, p. 720, ll. 28 ff.:  "we encourage fearful hearts in this manner:  'Believe that you have been baptized into Christ.  I absolve you from your sins in the name of Christ, who died for you and rose again, and said:  "Because I live, you will live also"'" (LW 8, trans. Paul D. Pahl, p. 189).

1542 February 18, TR 5658a, WA TR 5, p. 295, ll. 27-30:  "Alioquin illae cogitationes sunt diabolicae de praedestinatione.  Ficht dich die cogitation an, so sprich:  Ego sum filius Dei, sum baptizatus, credo in Iesum Christum pro me crucifixum, Iaß mich zu friden, du Teufel!  Tum illa cogitation te deseret."  This one is not included in LW 54.

In any case, the "inkwell" or "inkpot" story is a myth.  Cf.

• Roper, Lyndal.  Martin Luther:  renegade and prophet (New York:  Random House, 2017), 186-187 (without support).
• Oberman, Heiko Augustinus. "Luther against the devil." Christian century 107, no. 3 (January 24, 1990): 75-79, which refers to “later” references to the inkwell story separately from the following Luther-quotation (which I have not yet tracked to source):  "'The only way to drive away the Devil is through faith in Christ, by saying:  ‘I have been baptized, I am a Christian’” (see p. 105 (?) of the Oberman biography (Luther:  man between God and the devil) from which this is excerpted.
• Hendrix, Scott A.  http://www.christianitytoday.com/history/issues/issue-34/legends-about-luther.html, which calls the “inkwell” story in particular a kind of true myth.
• Etc.

"it is not that the myth of Thoth concerning the supreme god and the treacherous scribe anticipates the positive truth of grammatology, but rather that grammatology just repeats (identically) the myth of Thoth."

     John Milbank, Theology and social theory:  beyond secular reason, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA:  Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 312, on Derrida (about whom I myself know next to nothing).  Milbank's point (throughout this chapter, and indeed the book) is that the latter ontological "conjecture" is every bit as plausible as the former.