"the pursuits of biology, medicine, psychology and the social sciences, may [1-2] rectify our everyday conceptions of plants and animals, and even of man and society; but we must set against any such modification its effect on  the interest by which the study of the original subject matter had been prompted and justified. If the scientific virtues of  exact observation and  strict correlation of data are given absolute preference for the treatment of a subject matter which disintegrates when represented in such terms, the result will be irrelevant to the subject matter and probably of no  interest at all."
Michael Polanyi, Personal knowledge: towards a post-critical philosophy, pt. 2, chap. 6, sec. 2 ((London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962 ), 137). Polanyi is here weighing the first two of the three factors constitutive of "scientific value" against the third (pp. 135-136), and grounding the third, or "intrinsic interest," in "ordinary" or "everyday" or "pre-scientific interest".